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Abstract
This paper analyzes the sensitivity of market crashes to investors’
psychology in a standard general equilibrium framework. Contrary to
the traditional view that market crashes are driven by large drops in
aggregate endowments, we argue from a theoretical standpoint that
individual anticipations of such drops are a necessary condition for
crashes to occur, and that the magnitude of such crashes are positively
correlated with the level of individual anticipations of drops.
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1 Introduction
Sudden crashes are common features of financial markets. For instance, the
1994 Peso crisis in Mexico saw lending rates rising by four hundred percent
over four months. Psychological factors are believed to play an important
role in such situations, although the actual mechanisms linking such factors
and market volatility are not yet fully explored.
This paper analyzes the sensitivity of market crashes to investors’ psychol-
ogy in a standard general equilibrium framework. Contrary to the traditional
view that market crashes are driven by large drops in aggregate endowments,
we argue from a theoretical standpoint that individual anticipations of such
drops are a necessary condition for crashes to occur, and that the magnitude
of such crashes are positively correlated with the level of individual antici-
pations. Anticipations of changes in fundamentals, driven by psychological
factors as described later or also simply by rational expectations, are shown
here to be a key explanatory factor of market volatility.
In a General Equilibrium economy with incomplete markets where no
trader is constrained in borrowing in equilibrium, we make explicit a link
between future albeit uncertain endowments drops and their anticipations
sustaining any crash level. We quantify this relationship and illustrate the
above findings through numerical simulations in the framework of Mehra and
Prescott (1985). In particular, we show that when anticipations are not high
enough then a crash may not occur as a result of a drop in endowments. We
thus establish that changes in fundamentals alone may not trigger a crash.
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The basic insight of our results is that, when anticipating a future albeit
uncertain drop in aggregate endowments, traders take immediate financial
positions to hedge against this event. The hedging can only be achieved by
purchasing assets paying off positive dividends in this event, thus current
purchasing prices are high and in turn returns are low at the time dividends
are paid. This intuition also shows why agents must not be constrained in
borrowing, since otherwise the demand for assets would be bounded above
and prices could not be high enough to generate significant crashes. The
importance of limiting borrowing possibilities in similar situations can be
found in Hong and Stein (2003), although in this last reference short-sale
constraints prevent bearish investors from initially participating in markets
and revealing their information through prices.
Psychological factors affecting market volatility in our analysis are both
at individual and social levels. At individual level, those factors can be for
instance herding, market rumors, fear of contagion or panic (or possibly all
those issues together, see Shiller, 2000). We do not sort which one seems
most likely, but rather we argue that every psychological factor leading to an
individual anticipation contributes to both a crash occurrence and its magni-
tude. Our analysis emphasizes that anticipations of changes in fundamentals
are a key element to a crash, regardless of their formations and predictive
accuracy. At social level, it must also be true that bearish sentiments must
be shared by most traders (rumors or panic reached the whole market for
instance); that is, market exuberance leading to a significant increase in mar-
ket volatility (as in Shiller, 2000) must emerge from a behavioral correlation
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across market participants about the occurrence of a change in fundamentals,
regardless of whether such anticipations are justified.
In more details, we analyze a standard General Equilibrium economy un-
der uncertainty, where infinitely-lived agents with heterogenous beliefs trade
infinitively-live assets, or Lucas’ trees as in Lucas (1978), in sequential mar-
kets that need not be complete. To rule out the possibility of rolling over
individual debts, we assume that agents cannot borrow more than the net
present value of their future endowments (wealth constraint).
We define an ε−crash (for ε > 0) as an event where the return of every
traded asset paying off positive dividends in this event is below ε. Provided
that agents are not wealth-constrained in equilibrium (this occurs with com-
plete markets for instance), we find that if there is a high enough lower bound
on the probability that every agent assigns to a low enough upper bound on
a next-period drop in aggregate endowment, then a market crash occurs with
positive probability next period. The magnitude of the crash (the “ε”) de-
pends directly on the bounds found above. It is easy to derive from the proof
of this result that if agents are constrained in borrowing in equilibrium, then
low crashes cannot occur because equilibrium assets’ demands are bounded
above, and thus asset prices cannot reach high levels.
We also carry out numerical simulations in the well-known framework of
Mehra and Prescott (1985) to make explicit the direct relationship between
the above bounds sustaining an arbitrary magnitude of crash. In this setting,
we show that for a given level of drop, the higher the level of anticipation the
higher the magnitude of the crash. Highest crash magnitudes are associated
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with the highest levels of anticipations, and high anticipations significantly
intensify the crash magnitudes regardless of the drop level.
Our results rely on the Inada conditions to obtain, although those condi-
tions alone cannot lead to a crash unless traders largely agree upon a variation
in fundamentals. The intuition is that the marginal disutility of a low con-
sumption level on a particular history, typical of Inada conditions, can be
compensated in terms of ex-ante utility by a low probability assigned to this
history by every agent. Thus in this situation, a low contingent consumption
need not be largely hedged against and a crash may not occur.
Our findings are consistent with the empirical findings above, although
our theoretical explanation differs from that in Lee (1998). Indeed, Lee
justifies crashes by information flows varying with private information, and
crashes occur as an informational cascade when enough signals of bad times
are released by traders. In contrast, we argue that crashes are driven by
financial decisions motivated by the anticipation of future albeit uncertain
variations in market fundamentals. This behavior requires a group coordina-
tion (or large agreement) about the actual state of the economy, although it
goes beyond the idea of private information as in Lee. The coordination that
we require for crashes to occur can stem from rational expectations, erratic
beliefs generated by psychological factors (see Allen et al. (2005) or Shiller,
2000) even if it incorporates as well the situation raised in Lee (1998) and
Ho and Stein (2003).
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2 The model
In this section, a formal description of the model is given. Time is discrete
and continues forever. In every period t ∈ N+, a state is drawn by nature
from a set S = {1, ..., L}, where L is strictly greater than 1. Before defining
how nature draws the states, we first need to introduce some notations.
Denote by St (t ∈ N ∪ {∞}) the t−Cartesian product of S. For every
history st ∈ St (t ∈ N), a cylinder with base on st is defined to be the
set C(st) = {s ∈ S∞| s = (st, ...)} of all infinite histories whose t initial
elements coincide with st. Define the set Γt (t ∈ N) to be the σ−algebra
which consists of all finite unions of cylinders with base on St.1 The sequence
(Γt)t∈N generates a filtration, and define Γ to be the σ−algebra generated
by ∪t∈NΓt. Given an arbitrary probability measure Q on (S∞,Γ), we define
dQ0 ≡ 1 and dQt to be the Γt−measurable function defined for every st ∈ St
(t ∈ N+) as
dQt(s) = Q(C(st)) where s = (st, ...).
Given data up to and at period t− 1 (t ∈ N), the probability according
to Q of a state of nature at period t, denoted by Qt, is
Qt(s) =
dQt(s)
dQt−1(s)
for every s ∈ S∞,
with the convention that if dQt−1(s)=0 then Qt(s) is defined arbitrarily.
In every period and for every finite history, nature draws a state of nature
according to an arbitrary probability distribution P on (S∞,Γ). To simplify
1The set Γ0 is defined to be the trivial σ−algebra, and Γ−1 = Γ0.
6
the analysis, we assume that Pst > 0 for every history st.
To conclude this section, we define the operators EQ to be the expectation
operator associated with Q. Finally, we say that a finite history st+p ∈ St+p
follows a finite history st ∈ St (t, p ∈ N), denoted by st+p ↪→ st, if there
exists s ∈ Sp such that st+p = (st, s).
2.1 The agents
In this section, economic agents are described. There is a finite number I ≥ 1
of infinitely-lived agents behaving competitively.
There is a single consumption good available in every period t (t ∈ N+).
Denote by cist the consumption of an agent i (i = 1, ..., I) in history st ∈ St
(t ∈ N+). In every period t (t ∈ N+) and in every history st ∈ St, every
agent i (i = 1, ..., I) is endowed with wist > 0 units of consumption goods.
In every period t ∈ N , and after the realization of the history st ∈ St, the
agents trade L ≥ 1 infinitely-lived assets, or Lucas’ trees as in Lucas (1978).
Every tree j (j = 1, ..., L) yields a dividend djst > 0 of units of consumption
good in history st. Let dst denote the vector (d
1
st , ..., d
L
st) for every st. The
supply of every tree is assumed to be 1 in every history.
The aggregate endowment wst , in every history st (st ∈ St and t ∈ N+),
is given by
wst =
∑
i
wist +
∑
j
djst .
The price in history st of one share of the tree j (1 ≤ j ≤ L) is denoted
by qjst , for every st ∈ St and t ∈ N+. Let qst denote the vector (q1st , ..., qLst)
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for every history st.
A portfolio θi for every agent i is a vector (θst)st∈St,t∈N+ of shares held
of the J trees in every history st, where θst = (θ
j
st)j is the vector of holdings
in history st and θ
j
st is the holding of j in this same history st. Every agent
i has an initial portfolio θi0 at date 0.
Every agent i does not have any information about P , the true probability
measure from nature draws the states; however agent i has a subjective
belief about nature represented by a probability measure P i on (S∞,Γ). We
assume that dP it (s) > 0 for every infinite history s and every period t, to
avoid problems of existence as pointed in Araujo and Sandroni (1999).
Every agent derives some utility in any history from consuming the only
consumption good present in the economy. We assume that agent i ranks
all the possible future consumption sequences c = (cst)st∈St,t∈N+ according to
the utility function
U i(c) = EP
i
∑
t∈N+
(βi)
tui(ct)
 , (1)
where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, ui is a strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable function. We assume
that ui satisfies the Inada condition, namely (ui)
′(c) 7→ ∞ as c 7→ 0.
The budget constraint faced in every history st by agent i is
cst +
∑
j
qjstθ
j
st ≤ wist +
∑
j
djstθ
j
st−1 +
∑
j
qjstθ
j
st−1 (2)
cst ≥ 0, (3)
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where st ↪→ st−1. The left-hand side of (2) represents the purchase of con-
sumption good at price normalized to 1 plus the purchase of new shares of
trees at current prices, and the right-hand side is the endowment plus the
dividends payments from previous holdings plus the proceeds from selling
the current holdings of trees at current prices.
Given the constraints faced by the traders, we also need to rule out the
possibility of rolling over any debt through excessive future borrowing, also
known as Ponzi’s scheme. Consider any vector of prices that is arbitrage-
free. As argued in Hernandez and Santos (1996), when a vector of prices q
is arbitrage-free there exists a sequence of positive numbers {pist}st∈St,t∈N+
with pis0 = 1 such that
pistq
j
st =
∑
s↪→st
pisd
j
s,
for every j (j = 1, ..., J) and st (st ∈ St and t ∈ N+). We now assume
that every agent cannot borrow more than the present value of her current
endowment at such prices. Formally, we assume that for any vector of prices q
that is arbitrage-free, every portfolio strategy satisfies the wealth constraints
qstθst ≥ −
1
pist
∑
sτ∈C(st)
pisτw
i
sτ for every st. (4)
This constraint naturally rules out Ponzi’s scheme, and it is chosen ar-
bitrarily among many others. Hernandez and Santos (1996) gives six other
constraints ruling out Ponzi’s schemes and shows that they are all equiva-
lent when markets are complete. Markets are not assumed to be complete
though.
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For every i, we define the budget set Bi(q) faced by agent i at prices q
as follows. If q is arbitrage-free, the budget set Bi(q) is the set of sequences
(c, θ) that satisfy conditions (2)-(4) above. If now the vector of prices has an
arbitrage opportunity, define Bi(q) as the set of sequences (c, θ) that satisfy
conditions (2)-(3) only.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence (c¯i, θ¯
i
)i and a system of prices q¯
such that
1. taking prices q¯ as given, for every i the vector (c¯i, θ¯
i
) is solution to the
program consisting of maximizing (1) subject to (c, θ) ∈ Bi(q¯), and
2. for every history st we have that
∑
i c¯
i
st = wst and
∑
i θ¯
i
st = 1.
The above definition requires that, taking prices as given, every agent
sequentially chooses consumption plans and portfolio holdings so as to max-
imize her expected utility, and markets for consumption good and trees all
clear in every history. It is also straightforward to see that the equilibrium
prices are arbitrage-free. Indeed, if otherwise then every agent will have an
infinite demand for at least one tree in at least one history, and Condition 2
in the above definition will always be violated. By a similar reasoning, it is
easy to check that equilibrium prices must be strictly positive.
2.2 Market crashes
We next describe the notion of market crashes occurring in financial markets.
This notion focuses on arbitrarily low returns on traded trees. For every
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system of asset prices q, define first the return of tree j (j = 1, ..., J) in
history st+1, when purchased in history st, as
Rjst+1 =
qjst+1 + d
j
st+1
qjst
(5)
if qjst > 0, and arbitrarily otherwise. With this notion, we can describe our
notion of market crash.
Definition 2 For every ε > 0, an ε-crash occurs in history st if R
j
st < ε for
every asset j such that djst > 0.
A market crash in a given history is thus defined as an arbitrarily low
return on every asset paying off strictly positive dividend in this history. In
the remainder of the paper, we are primarily interested in finding conditions
leading to arbitrarily low market crashes. In particular, we analyze how
individual anticipations of variations in market fundamentals can generate
crashes as described above.
3 Beliefs and market crashes
In this section, we study how market crashes are linked to anticipations of
variations in aggregate endowment, and what level of social coordination
about the anticipations is needed for a crash to occur.. Our result gives a
set of sufficient conditions on beliefs and aggregate endowments leading to
arbitrarily low market crashes.
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Proposition 3 Consider any equilibrium such that Constraint (4) does not
bind for every agent. Fix also ε > 0 and consider any history st. There
exist positive constants γ < 1 and δ < 1 such that if
wst
wst−1
≤ γ for some
predecessor st−1 of st, and if P ist > δ for every i, then an ε−crash occurs in
history st.
Proposition 3 states that, for any given crash magnitude, one can find
regions of parameters on endowment drop and drop anticipation sustaining
this crash. For this result to occur, agents must not be wealth-constraint
in equilibrium. The intuition of this result is given in the Introduction. A
natural case where the wealth constraints do not bind in equilibrium for
every agent is when markets are complete, as a straightforward consequence
of Theorem 3.3 in Hernandez and Santos (1996).
Proposition 3 implicitly states that an endowment drop alone may not
sustain a crash. For a crash to happen, two other conditions must be met.
First, there must be high enough individual anticipations about an endow-
ment drop next period; second, this sentiment must be shared by every agent
in the economy. It will appear clearly in the next section that, when those
conditions on anticipations are not met, an endowment drop alone may not
sustain a crash.
Quantifying the relationship between the parameters γ and δ sustain-
ing an arbitrary magnitude of crash is a central question of our analysis.
Making this link explicit in our general setting would lead to a very com-
plex and cumbersome technical analysis. Instead, we give next section the
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main quantitative features of this relationship in the well-known framework
of Mehra and Prescott (1985) through numerical simulations. The choice
of this framework is motivated by tractability reasons, and also for its large
impact in terms of macroeconomic analysis.
4 Numerical simulations
We now carry out some numerical simulations to find regions for the pa-
rameters described in Proposition 3 sustaining arbitrary levels of crashes.
We narrow down our model to that in Mehra and Prescott (1985), with the
difference that we do not assume any condition on the endowment process
and we allow for arbitrary beliefs. Our first simulation gives a region for
the parameters δ and γ sustaining a given crash magnitude for various lev-
els of risk-aversion. The second simulation shows that, for a given level of
endowment drop this time, the higher the anticipation the higher the crash
magnitude. The third simulation is a 3D-representation of crash magnitudes
as a function of both drops and anticipations, illustrating the intuitions given
in the Introduction.
We now assume, following Mehra and Prescott (1985), that in every pe-
riod two states only can occur. We also assume that there is one agent only
within the economy (a representative agent) forming subjective belief about
economic uncertainty. Even if strong in appearance, this last assumption has
already been largely justified in terms of macroeconomic analysis. Proposi-
tion 3 still remains relevant in this setting, the only conceptual loss is that it
13
rules out the need for social coordination about the anticipation of the crash
(this can be regarded as implicitly assumed). The representative agent has
a utility function of the form
U(c) = EP
∑
t∈N+
βtu(ct)
 ,
where P is an arbitrary belief process, where β ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, and
where the function u is defined as
u(x) =
x1−α − 1
1− α ,
for some α > 0 (this parameter is the coefficient of risk-aversion of the agent).
We show in Appendix B that the asset structure is irrelevant to carry out
our simulations, provided that the agent is not constrained in borrowing in
equilibrium.
Fix now any history st−1, let s¯t ↪→ st−1 be the history following st−1 where
the crash is expected and let st ↪→ st−1 be the other history following st−1.
In Appendix B, we show that
Rjs¯t ≤
1
β
· 1
Ps¯t
·
(
ws¯t
wst−1
)α
(6)
for every security j as before, and regardless of the asset structure provided
that the agent is not constraint in borrowing in equilibrium. In particular,
Inequality (6) shows that the upper-bound on equilibrium returns depends
only the parameters γ, δ, α and β. The following numerical simulations are
generated directly from this last inequality.
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From now on, we fix β = 0.9 since this parameter does not a critical role
in our analysis. Our first simulation provides a parameters region sustaining
a .85-crash, which corresponds to a drop of 15% in price of all assets traded
(assuming no dividend is paid).
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Figure 1: Parameters region sustaining a .85-crash (15% price drop)
Figure 1 simultaneously displays such regions for various level of risk-
aversion. For every curve, any point of parameters above the curve sustains
the .85-crash. For instance, for an agent with a level of risk-aversion of 5, any
20% drop in endowment next period that is anticipated with probability of at
least .5 in the current period will trigger a .85-crash next if the drop actually
occurs. Figure 1 also shows that, for those last values, any anticipation level
below .5 may not trigger the crash, as is explained in the Introduction. This
15
last point implies that the crash occurs independently of the true probability
of a drop next period, showing that the anticipation (together with the drop
of course) has driven the crash.
The next figure gives us a way to visualize the effect of drop anticipations
on the magnitude of a crash, given a particular drop of endowment next
period. We fix a 20% drop in the following simulation.
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Figure 2: Crash magnitude as a function of the anticipation δ (α = 10)
Figure 2 provides the direct link between the magnitude of the crash and
the anticipation of the drop. Its main implication is that, for a fixed drop
of endowment, the higher the anticipation the higher the crash magnitude.
The intuition of this point is also given in the Introduction.
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Figure 3 below maps crash magnitudes as a function of both the anticipa-
tion levels and endowments drops. Regions of relatively low endowment drops
Endowm
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0.8
Crash 
0.5
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Figure 3: ²-crash as a function of the anticipation and drop (α = 10)
and low anticipations leads to moderate crashes. Regions of high anticipa-
tions of drops trigger the highest levels of crash, and such high anticipations
significantly intensify the crash magnitudes regardless of the drop level. Pro-
vided that anticipations are high enough, severe drops in endowment lead
to severe crashes (as is commonly believed), but our point is to show that
anticipations do intensify this phenomena. That is, psychological factors as
described here turn crashes from bad to significantly worse.
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5 Conclusion
Our main result states that, as long as every agent is not constrained in
borrowing, a future albeit uncertain drop in endowments that is currently
anticipated with high enough probability by every agent will trigger a crash
if the drop actually occurs. Moreover, our simulations show that the crash
magnitude is positively correlated with the commonly agreed anticipation
level. Section 4 shows that those conditions are tight; that is, an endowment
drop may not trigger a crash if the anticipation level is not high enough.
The basic insight is that, when expecting future low endowments, agents
will increase their demand for securities to hedge against this event. This, in
turn, will raise the purchasing price of those securities and therefore will lower
their returns. In particular, to arbitrarily increase their holdings and thus
to induce such crashes, agents must not be constrained in their borrowing
capabilities.
The psychological factors that we put forth in our study are two-fold.
First, any factor leading an individual to believe in the occurrence of a drop
is relevant because such beliefs will act as self-fulfilling prophecies. Those
beliefs can stem from instance from herding, market rumors, fear of contagion
or panic (or possibly all those issues together). We do not sort which one
seems most likely, but rather we point out that they are all relevant because
they lead to the same phenomena: a crash anticipation. Second, it must be
true that all the agents in the economy agree on the anticipation (herding or
rumors have reached the whole market for instance). This second point must
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occur so that anticipations can have a significant effect on prices formation.
This view is somewhat consistent with that in Lee (1998) where crashes ar
driven by successive releases of public information on the actual state of the
economy.
Finally, the fact that with incomplete markets agents must not be wealth
constrained for arbitrary level of crashes to occur suggests a natural policy
recommendation. Indeed, limiting agents’ borrowing abilities when bad times
are largely anticipated appears as a natural way to reduce the magnitude of
market crashes.
A Proof of Proposition 3
We next prove our result. The strategy of our proof goes as follows. We first
find an equilibrium relationship between beliefs, aggregate endowments and
equilibrium returns. We then derive our result by simply using the Inada
conditions to generate an arbitrarily high marginal utility as endowments
drop, forcing equilibrium returns to drop as well.
Consider the program of any agent i, consisting of maximizing (1) subject
to (c, θ) ∈ Bi(q¯) and taking as given any arbitrage-free and strictly positive
asset prices. Since we assume that Constraint (4) does not bind, and since
we know by the Inada conditions that Constraint (3) does not bind as well,
the Lagrangian to this program rewrites as
L =
∑
st
dP istβ
t
iui(cst)+
∑
st
µst
[
wist +
∑
j
djst−1θ
j
st − cst +
∑
j
qjst(θ
j
st − θjst−1)
]
,
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where for every history st the real number µst > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the Constraint (2). Taking the first-order conditions with
respect to every variable yields the following relationships for every history
st−1 and asset j
dP ist−1 · βt−1i · u′i(cst−1) = µst−1 and (7)∑
st↪→st−1
µst · [djst + qjst ] = µst−1 · qjst−1 , (8)
Rearranging terms gives∑
st↪→st−1
dP ist · βti · u′i(cst) · [djst + qjst ] = dP ist−1 · βt−1i · u′i(cst−1) · qjst−1 , (9)
and by (5) and some simplifications we obtain the desired relationship∑
st↪→st−1
P ist · βi · u′i(cst) ·Rjst = u′i(cst−1). (10)
With the above relationship, we can prove our result. Fix ε > 0 and a
history s¯t. It is easy to see that, for every δ > 0 such that P
i
s¯t > δ for every
i, there exists an agent, denoted by δ(i), such that for the history s¯t−1 such
that s¯t ↪→ s¯t−1 we have that cδ(i)s¯t−1 ≥
ws¯t−1
I
in equilibrium.
Since ui satisfies the Inada conditions for every i, this last remark implies
that the expression u′δ(i)(c
δ(i)
s¯t−1) is bounded away from +∞ for every δ > 0.
Also, since c
δ(i)
s¯t ≤ ws¯t and by the Inada conditions, a low enough value of
aggregate endowment ws¯t in history s¯t will increase the left-hand side of (10)
above to an arbitrary high level. Thus, as δ converges to 1 and ws¯t converges
to 0, for (10) to hold for agent δ(i) it must be true that Rjs¯t converges to
0 for every j such that djs¯t > 0. Thus, it is straightforward to find the two
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constants δ and γ as described in Proposition 3 satisfying Rjs¯t < ε for every
j as above.
We have thus shown that, for the constants δ and γ found above, an
ε-crash occurs in history s¯t. The proof is now complete.
B An inequality for numerical simulations
We now derive an upper-bound on equilibrium returns that depends on the
parameters described in Proposition 3, under the assumptions of Section 4.
This uniform upper-bound readily allows for the numerical simulations given
in this last section.
Fix any history st−1, and let s¯t ↪→ st−1 and st ↪→ st−1 be defined as in
Section 4. Consider any security j such that Equation (10) holds for those
histories. Given the shape of our utility function, and since the consumption
of the representative agent must be the aggregate endowment in every history,
Equation (10) rewrites as
Ps¯t
(
1
ws¯t
)α
Rjs¯t + (1− Ps¯t)
(
1
wst
)α
Rjst =
1
β
(
1
wst−1
)α
, (11)
for every security j as described above. Rearranging terms gives
Rjs¯t =
1
Ps¯t
(ws¯t)
α
[
1
β
(
1
wst−1
)α
− (1− Ps¯t)
(
1
wst
)α
Rjst
]
. (12)
Moreover, since in equilibrium it must be true that Rjst > 0, we obtain the
following inequality
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Rjs¯t ≤
1
β
· 1
Ps¯t
·
(
ws¯t
wst−1
)α
for every security j as above. The right-hand side of Inequality (B) depends
on the parameters described in Proposition 3, together with the intertemporal
discount factor β and the coefficient of risk-aversion α. This last inequality
directly yields the numerical simulations presented in Section 4.
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